A New Look at Scientific Method
Ever since the beginning
of modern science there has been a belief among scientists, philosophers,
and even lay people, that there is a scientific method. How this method
actually works, there is conflicting opinion, but most believe there is
such a method. It is this method, they believe, that enables scientists
to enlarge our knowledge. In the last fifty years, however, the situation
has changed. While many scientists and lay people still believe that there
is a scientific method, more and more philosophers have gone over to Popper's
view that there is no such thing. According to Popper there is no method
that would lead us to knowledge, or even closer to it. Paradoxically,
however, Popper also says that there is a method that would help us make
scientific discoveries: the method of conjectures and refutations. But
these discoveries are not discoveries of what the world is like, Popper
says; they are only discoveries of theories that, hopefully, will be able
to stand up to many attempted refutations before they are finally refuted.
What the world is really like we do not know, Popper says. In carrying
out scientific research we hope our theories will come closer and closer
to giving us a true description of what the world is like, but while it
is legitimate or even essential for us to have this hope, we can have
no indication that it is ever realised (according to Popper).
I shared Popper's
view on scientific method for quite some time, but an idea occurred to
me somewhere around the late seventies that Popper might not be right
about scientific method after all. As I have said, Popper thinks that
we can have no indication whatsoever whether our theories are coming closer
to the truth (even though we hope they are). The idea that occurred to
me tells me that there are indications of this kind. Because of this idea,
I find that I have to revamp my understanding of scientific method in
major ways. The change, I have only recently come to realise, is in fact
nothing less than a 'revolution' (as in 'scientific revolution').
And this is reflected
in my writings. In my earlier writings on this subject I tend to concentrate
on this idea that has brought about my change of view (see for example
my paper, 'Empirical tests are only auxiliary devices,'
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 39, 1988, pp211-223).
In my more recent writings I try to situate this idea in a larger context
in order that we can more properly appreciate its importance. It is difficult
to understand the importance of a bare idea, especially when it is couched
in terms the public is not familiar with. The more context one can provide
for the idea, the easier it is to appreciate its significance. In my recent
writings I do not usually start with the idea that brought about my change
of view, but with things more familiar to my readers. And this is possible
because the so-called scientific method is in practice embedded in the
way we follow clues. Because of the popularity of detective stories, most
people have some idea how we should follow clues. They know that by following
clues they can come to know things that they originally did not know.
Now it does not matter that in detective stories the criminals know all
along what the detectives will discover. It does not matter because the
remarkable thing is that the detectives can find out by themselves, without
asking the criminals (in many countries in the world today people accused
of crimes have a right to remain silent). Now scientists follow clues
too, and it is remarkable that they can discover things by themselves
without asking God. How do scientists discover things by themselves? They
do it the same way that detectives do it: by following clues. How do detectives
know they have caught the right person? How do scientists know that they
have found the right law (of nature)? They know not by asking the criminal
or by asking God; they know because in the course of following clues they
will have been following the scientific method. If we have a method we
do not need to ask. This is the beauty in having a method. A method enables
us to find things out on our own, without asking anybody. Because we have
a method (algorithm) for adding together numbers we can all find out on
our own that 1680786 + 3956142 = 5636928, doing so without counting fingers.
The scientific method
is not special to science. The name 'scientific method' merely means a
method that leads to knowledge. Anybody can use the scientific method,
and we are using it when we are following clues. But the scientific method
cannot be employed apart from following clues. If we do not follow clues
we cannot employ the scientific method.
Traditionally, it
is the job of philosophers to clarify scientific method, but no philosopher--or
any one else for that matter--has ever explained in detail how we should
follow clues! Any wonder then that no one is all that clear as to how
the scientific method works. The method can only be understood in the
context of following clues. If we do not pay attention to this context
we should not be surprised to find the method puzzling, that is, difficult
to explain. Compare this to a motor-car. We see the car's wheels turning,
propelling the car forward. Now there is no mystery in this if we know
that the wheels are connected to the motor-car engine. If we do not, that
the car can move will become a mystery. 'No horses, and yet the car moves!'
We depend on clues
to lead us to knowledge in all kinds of areas. In view of the importance
that clues play in our lives we should make a study of how we should follow
clues (following clues, as we all know, is not a simple matter). I have
done this in my book, The Art of Detection,
and I have given this new study a name: Theseology (not to be confused
with theology), after Theseus of Greek mythology, who led himself out
of the Labyrinth by following a thread after killing the Minotaur. In
this book readers will see that in following clues we will be using the
scientific method, which, to draw attention to its connection to clues,
I also call the theseological method. The scientific or theseological
method as I explain it in this book is very different from all the many
popular versions of the scientific method. It is highly unlikely that
those not familiar with my work will describe scientific method the way
I describe it.
Traditionally, following
clues is thought to be a form of reasoning. I have discovered that this
is not so. There is more to following clues than reasoning. Following
clues is an art distinct from the art of reasoning, as much as photography
is, even though in both photography and following clues we reason. I provide
some argument for this in my paper, 'Is Sherlock
Holmes a logician or theseologist?'. For a more detailed explanations
of why the art of following clues is distinct from the art of reasoning
readers should consult The Art of Detection.
To help readers
understand my current views on scientific method, I have written 'Four
caricatures of the knowing process', in which I compare my own views
as to how knowledge is obtained to four popular views. The latter all
suffer from an oversight of the roles (plural) clues play in the knowing
process. Clues, I explain, do not just suggest theories; they also help
in determining if the theories suggested are true or close to the truth.
Philosophers have
been interested in how knowledge is possible for a long time. Clues lead
to knowledge; yet it is not common in philosophy to ask the question,
what are clues? In 'What are clues? And
why it is important that we should know', I raise the question and
provide answers.
My thinking on scientific method, as well as on science itself, is still developing. I hope that as time passes I shall have more to share with my readers. In the meantime I welcome any help they can provide, including of course criticisms. I can be reached by email at tlai@mun.ca. Requests for reprints can also be sent to the same address.
Tyrone Lai
Department of Philosophy
Memorial University of Newfoundland
St John's, Newfoundland
Canada A2C 5S7
